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SOMPONG SUCHARITKUL*

Liability and Responsibility of the State of
Registration or the Flag State in Respect of Sea-Going
Vessels, Aircraft and Spacecraft Registered by
National Registration Authorities
I. AN

INDUCTIVE APPROACH

The topic selected for this report forms part of a broader picture:
"the Liability of Registration authorities," which embraces a wider
scope of enquiry, principally covering an infinite variety of international regulations within comparable national legal orders. Civil liability may require consideration of legal questions for which practical
solution may only be found beyond the confines of internal law, in the
choice of applicable law as part of private international law, or ultimately in the direct or indirect application of a rule of public international law, as recognized by States and incorporated in negotiated
provisions of a Treaty.
As the main branch of the area of the law under study is III. D.
Air and Maritime Law/Droit Aerien et Maritime, there appears to be
ample justification for undertaking an examination of the question of
liability, not only by comparing the rules in one legal system with
several others, but also by comparing analogous rules adopted for
maritime transport with those applicable to civil and commercial aviation, and even to space travel.
In the ultimate analysis, the question of civil liability of an
agency of a State or an organ of an international organization performing registration functions cannot escape the control or regulation
by a competent authority of the prevailing international legal order.
Nor for that matter could liability avoid the application of the relevant rules of international law. States and international organizations exercising the functions of registering all modes of international
transport are clearly and equally responsible before the law in the
eyes of international law. In this connection, international law is undergoing a constant process of evolution to crystallize a minimum
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universal standard of responsibility and liability on the part of States
and international agencies in the field of maritime transport as well
as in civil and commercial aviation, as indeed equally also in space
flight and space voyage.
The present study will follow a logical pattern of systemic sequence. First, it will in due course examine the practice of the United
States with regard to the liability of its registration authorities with
its limitations and qualifications, inevitably engaging the State responsibility of the United States in respect of any harm or injury,
physical or financial, incurred by non-nationals within or outside the
United States as the result of a wrongful act, or negligent handling,
or willful conduct committed by an agency of the United States Government, or an independent contractor acting on behalf of the State,
in connection with the registration of a sea-going vessel of the size
and category and with the permit to fly United States flag.
In the second place, the study will address the varying requirements and diverse qualifications for registration of an aircraft of different designs and purposes to enable such vehicles of transport to
take to the air and to be air-borne or to take off on a flight within or
across and beyond the national boundaries of the United States for
the carriage of goods and passengers or other peaceful purposes.
These are matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) of the United States. The liability of
the registration authorities is governed by federal legislation superimposed on various State legislative requirements. The civil liabilities and their limitations, exemptions and privileges as well as
immunities of the United States competent authorities for the process of examination, attestation and registration are regulated by
State law as well as by Federal Regulations.
The basic needs and requirements of proof of ownership and airworthiness for purposes of eligibility for registration in the United
States are essentially not far different from those for registration of
sea-going vessels with permits to fly United States flags.
Finally, liabilities for registration authorities in respect of space
vehicles, space objects and satellites closely resemble those of aircraft, as space travel and space shuttle services are analogous to air
traffic, flight navigation or civil and commercial aviation. The treatment of the three means of transport, sea voyage, flight or passage
through space, is sometimes merged or combined under the heading
of multi-modal transport, comprehending the carriage of goods and
passengers by land, by sea including waterways, and by air including
eventually space transport.
The current survey of State practice in the three modes or means
of international transport may lend itself to some tentative conclusions, based on an empirical comparison of State practice particularly
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the United States model as well as international standards. It is conceivable that there may be an intermediary regime between maritime
and air law as between aviation and space shuttle. This study will
follow an inductive method.
II.
A.

MARITIME LAW

General Considerations

Maritime law constitutes a branch of the law within a national
legal system, designed to regulate the carriage of goods and passengers by sea, or the carrying trade by water, traversing the sea or the
ocean through national or international waterways. It does not necessarily preclude consideration of safety and security at sea, in the
ocean or hazards to navigation whether in the nature of piracy jure
gentium or terrorism at sea, domestic as well as international.
The current survey is confined to certain legal aspects of civil liability of registration authorities for any harm, damage, or injury to
person or property resulting from the operation of a sea-going vessel
especially after it has been duly inspected and registered with certificates of documentation and sea-worthiness as well as permit to operate under the flag of a particular State, in this case, the United
States of America as a point of departure.
Under the Law of the Sea Convention 1982,1 every ship must
have a nationality and fly a national flag of a State. A sea-going vessel may not fly more than one flag. 2 However, it can fly a flag of an
international organization, such as the United Nations or ASEAN.
Every sea-going vessel is additionally required to carry a paper, or
certificate of documentation, indicating its size, tonnage replacement,
construction ship-yard and a name for purpose of its identification. It
has to be equipped with safety devices and radio telecommunication
set to ensure its location or geographical coordinates at sea, its
known point of departure and declared destination of a voyage. It
has to have a call-sign to be able to announce its whereabouts and its
intention to enter and visit a port of call. These are also needed to
report an emergency to call for assistance, salvage service or rescue
at sea.
International law does not impose on every maritime State nor
land-locked State any detailed regulation or specific requirement for
1. See in particular, Articles 90-91 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,
signed at the Montigo Bay, Jamaica, December 10, 1982, and entered into force on
November 16, 1994 among various States. However, Thailand and USA have not ratified the Convention, although, except for Part XI, most other substantive parts reflect
the current status of customary international law on the subject.
2. See id., Part VII, the High Seas, Articles 92-100 of the Convention Official
Text with Annexes and Index, UN. NY, 1983.

.•
412

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 54

registration of a ship with a permit to fly a national flag. 3 Rather
every State has the fullest authority to adopt, modify, amend and
vary at will the necessary requirements for registration of a vessel as
part of its flag, either as a merchant marine, a fishing vessel, a ferry,
a tanker, a transport ship, a cruise vessel, a man of war or battle
ship, a cruiser, a torpedo-boat, an auxiliary vessel, a hospital boat, a
sub-marine, a destroyer, a nuclear sub-marine, a coast guard, a frigate, a tug boat, an explorer or training vessel for various educational,
scientific and experimental purposes, and ultimately an aircraft carrier and an aquapolis. 4 It is clearly beyond the scope of this brief
survey to examine national qualifications and requirements of every
maritime nation for each of the categories of the above-mentioned
vessels.
The present study starts with maritime law and incidentally
touches upon some of the requirements and qualifications for a vessel
to be registered under a United States flag, namely, ownership and
place of construction in order to ascertain the nature and extent of
the liabilities and responsibilities of the registration authorities. In
the United States practice, the task of testing, attesting or verifying
the qualifications and requirements for registration is not infrequently delegated or assigned to what is known as a 'Societe de classification' or "Classification Society.' Performance of these delegated
tasks by expert societies does not exonerate the flag State of its primary or principal responsibility. Whatever faults and imperfections
or 'fautes de service' committed in the performance of these functions
are attributed, as they are imputable, to the State.

B.

Status of Ships and Liability to Arrest in Foreign Jurisdictions
1. Jurisdictional and Procedural Issues

One of the first questions to be examined relates to jurisdictional
issues whether an act of State or an act of the State, exercising its
sovereign authority in the discharge of its inspection duties and functions is subject to the jurisdiction of any authority, administrative or
judicial, within or outside the United States. This study will address
a few topical questions relating to the liability of the flag State or its
registration agencies or authorities in any civil proceedings, involving
such questions as the certificate of sea-worthiness of a vessel, its registered name, title-holder and changes. This may affect its prompt
release or loss of standing of claimant or absence of jurisdiction of an
international instance.
3. Id., Article 91(2): obligation to issue document.
4. Japan launched an aquapolis, a submersible marine city to farm under-water
plants and to cultivate fish cultures.
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It is useful to appreciate certain procedural distinctions or peculiarities of a suit in admiralty before a judicial instance of a common
law system such as the United States and the United Kingdom. In
the traditional theories of the common law, a ship is a unique species
of chattel in the sense that an action can be brought against a ship as
such in rem, where the writ or libel in rem against the ship can be
served by posting the writ on the main mask, but it is at the same
time addressed to the owner and master or captain of the vessel also
in personam. A proceeding in rem against a ship can be initiated with
its arrest or seizure ad fundandam jurisdictionum, which, strange
but true, can be served and effected not only against the ship that has
itself been at fault, but also in its absence, against any sister ship of
the same fleet. 5 A ship is at times considered fictitiously as a floating
territory, 6 but that fiction is exploded as a legal basis for territorial
jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the flag State is based on nationality
of the vessel as evidenced by the national flag it flies and not on any
fiction ofterritoriality similar to the exploded theory of extraterritoriality of embassies entailing inviolability of diplomatic and consular
premises. 7

2.

Liability in rem

The liability of a ship in rem is comparable to noxal liability or
liability of the owner under Roman Law at various periods to surrender the vicious animal, such as a mad dog. The owner of a vicious dog
that inflicted injury upon a person would be liable vicariously for the
injury caused by the dog. The owner could choose to keep the dog and
pay the compensation or penalties for damage caused or surrender
the dog to the victim. Thus, noxal surrender resembles the arrest of a
vessel to ensure that the harm caused by the vessel is redressed either by the owner or master of the ship agreeing to compensate for
the loss suffered or from the proceeds of sale of the vessel arrested.
By the same token, a complainant in the ancient Roman legal system
could detain the vicious dog as security for payment of compensation
by its owner for the injury inflicted by the dog8 in the event the owner
wished to have his dog back. Proof of ownership is invariably contained in the registration paper, hence the liability and responsibility
of the Registration authorities to register any transfer of title to the
ship.
5. See I Congreso del Partido, [1983] AC 244. House of Lords Decision relating to
the Playa Larga and the Marble Island, Cuban ships. See also Lord Atkin in the Cristina [1938] A.C. at p. 490.
6. See the reasoning of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the SS
Lotus, (France v. Turkey) 1927, PCIJ Report Series A. No. 10; 2 Hudson World Ct.
Rep. 20.
7. See EDWARD R. ADAIR, THE EXTERRITORIALITY OF EMBASSIES IN THE XVITH AND
XVIITH CENTURIES (1929).
8. See Lex Aquilia, A.D. 287, DIGEST 49.
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International Regulation of Arrest of Ships

The institution of noxal liability or noxal surrender was normal
in more primitive societies. Today, traces of such practice could only
be found as a security or cautio for payment of compensation in discharge ofliability for a tort or civil wrong. Nevertheless, the arrest of
vessels has become more frequent in modern maritime law, both comparative and international. The frequent uses of arrest of ships have
led to an international endeavor to put the current practice on a more
rational and generally accepted basis. Ninety-five sea-faring nations
including the United States and Thailand as well as Hong Kong and
Macao, attended the UNIIMO Diplomatic Conference on Arrest of
Ships from 1 to 12 March 1999 in Geneva. The Conference was also
attended by International Organizations, as observers, such as the
Arab Labor Organization, OAU, OAS, OIC and the Intergovernmental Organization for International Carriage by Rail. Several NGOs
also attended the Conference as observers.9 The draft articles were
prepared by the joint UNCTADIIMO Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Maritime Liners and Mortgages and Related subjects. 10
The UN/IMO Convention on Arrest of Ships 1999 serves to
standardize and regulate rules and procedures for arrest and release
of ships. As indicated in its Preamble, 11 the States Parties to the
Convention recognize the desirability of facilitating the harmonious
and orderly development of world sea-borne trade and are convinced
of the necessity for a legal instrument establishing international uniformity in the field of arrest of ships, taking into account recent developments in related fields. Many basic terms have been defined for
the purposes. The power of arrest is vested in the Court of the State
party in which the arrest is effected in respect only of a maritime
claim as defined. The purpose of the arrest is to obtain security for a
maritime claim for which the owner or demise charterer is liable.
Sister-ship jurisdiction is permissible for the arrest of a ship or ships
owned by a person liable for the maritime claim, or is otherwise
chartered to that person. 12 A ship so arrested is to be released when
sufficient security has been provided in a satisfactory form. 13

9. See documents NCONF. 188/6, 19 March 1999; also NCONF. 188/2, and 188/

5.
10. See document TD/B/IGB.l/5; NCONF.188/3 Add. 103; and NCONF.188/2.
The United States attended and signed the final Act. Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam also signed the Final Act. Most sea-faring nations
signed the Final Act, including Switzerland.
11. See document NCONF.188/6, Preambles.
12. See id., Article 3 (1) and (2).
13. Id., Article 4 (1) and (2).
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Responsibility of a Flag State in Respect of Sea-Going Vessels
Flying Its Flag

That the flag State has primary, if not indeed exclusive, jurisdiction over all ships flying its flag on the high seas, no one today can
dispute, nor can anyone deny the predominant authority of the flag
State. Opinion and practice of States lack uniformity with regard to
the nature and extent of the responsibility of the flag State in respect
of the activities of sea-going vessels flying its flag. The exercise of the
authority to register a ship by whatever body or agency as a United
States vessel entitled to fly United States flag is attributable to the
United States.
The prevailing opinion and practice of the United States appear
to be the most outstanding if not indeed the most extensive, not only
in regard to the basic jurisdiction over the vessels, but also with respect to the obligations and responsibilities that the United States
Government is prepared to undertake to protect and defend the
safety and security of all ships flying United States flag on the highseas or anywhere else. The United States practice has been relatively consistent in its assumption of the function and responsibility
to preserve and protect the integrity of the United States from any
armed attack by whomsoever and wherever launched. Different categories of ships merit different consideration.
1.

Man-of-War

The most obvious example of United States position and policy is
its treatment of any armed attack against or upon its warship or government ship being invariably regarded as an attack against the
United States. This may prompt a series of response to the armed
attack, as in various instances such as the Gulf of Tonkin incident, 14
the Gulf of Sidra incidents, 15 the attack against the USS Pueblo off
the coast of North Korea, 16 and the USS Cole off the shore of
Yemen. 17 United States warships have been targets of attack even
14. This has led US Congress to adopt a resolution authorizing the President to
commit US armed forces, including ground troops, to fight in Vietnam in the sixties
and early seventies.
15. In 1981, the US took occasion to respond to the two attacking Libyan Fitters,
and after downing both Libyan Fitters, the US fighter aircraft removed the shore
batteries and radar stations of Libya during a missiles exercise of the USS Nimitz
(CVN-68) in the high-seas in the Gulf of Sidra, which Libya had claimed to be within
its territorial waters. This was generally viewed as an exercise of US self defense
against Libya. Another incident recurred in 1989 resulting in two US F14 Tomcats
shooting down the Libyan Mig-23 Flogger-Es.
16. The USS Pueblo was attacked by North Korean forces in the Sea of Japan in
1968 and its crew members were detained for 11 months before they were released.
17. The USS Cole was attacked by a suicide squad of the Al-Qaeda in October
2000.
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from friendly fires. 18 This accounts for a stern position taken by the
United States in response to armed attacks against its warships, as if
it were an armed attack or aggression against the territorial integrity
of the United States itself.
There was not much adverse or critical reaction from world public opinion as to the duties or responsibilities of the United States
Government to defend and protect its own land from armed attackers, and to extend these functions to cover warships as if they constituted 'floating territories' of the United States, hence the revival of a
kind of a long exploded fiction of territoriality attached to a man-ofwar. Nevertheless, the extent to which the United States could exercise the right of self-defense in such cases has not escaped severe and
in several instances justifiable criticisms. The case on point was the
self-protection or alleged self-defense of the USS Vincennes 19 against
possible attacks by vessels or aircraft which turned out to be an innocent Iranian civilian Airbus carrying Muslim passengers from Teheran to Saudi Arabia to do their annual pilgrimage.
2.

Private-Owned or Private-Operated Vessels

The fiction of territoriality may be said to have been overstretched when applied to ordinary sea-going vessels not forming
part of the United States navy. United States armed intervention in
numerous instances for the purpose of providing protection for
United States commercial flags have not been supported by world
public opinion, nor clearly established rule of customary international law. The Mayaguez Incident (1975) 20 in the Gulf of Thailand,
was the case on point, when the Mayaguez, flying a United States
flag, was attacked and seized by piratical rebel forces of the Khmers
Rouges, the United States Navy decided to respond by attacking
Kampuchea under cover of self-defense to liberate and recover the
Mayaguez. 21
18. On 17 May 1987, the USS Stark was attacked by two air-to-surface missiles
from an Iraqi Air Force F1 Mirage, being mistaken for an Iranian frigate.
19. On 3 July 1988, the Iranian Airbus 300, IR655, was downed by the USS Vincennes surface to air missiles. The error offact or mistake of identity could only afford
an excuse to establish absence of criminal intent or mens rea, but it could in no way
exonerate the US Government from the secondary obligation to wipe out the consequences of its internationally wrongful act, though not necessarily criminal.
20. Piracy ex jure gentium was not unknown in international law. Pirates are
treated as hostes generis humani (enemies of mankind), and as such can be attacked
anywhere on the high-seas or on dry land to deny them shelter to provide safety for
international maritime trade.
21. It should be noted that the Thai Government specifically notified the US
forces in Thailand not to use any Thai base to launch an attack on Kampuchea or on
the Mayaguez. But the US armed forces did not heed that warning.
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Reflagging of Private-Owned Tankers

The question of reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers as United States
vessels flying United States flag deserves serious consideration. It is
not without significance that a United States registration authority
could register or change the registration of a Kuwaiti tanker and allowed it to fly a United States flag. The apparent purpose is to permit the United States armed forces to provide effective protection to
the reflagged US - Kuwaiti tankers, carrying Iraqi crude oil from the
Persian Gulf.
Many incidents occurred in the height of Iran-Iraq war of the
1980s. The United States was not a party to the bilateral armed conflict. Its interest was to protect the safety of navigation in the Persian Gulf which was the theatre for naval warfare between the two
warring Gulf Nations. Under the law of international armed conflicts, the United States should observe strict neutrality and refrain
from taking side.
In the case of an attack on the USS Stark in 1987, the United
States Government did not take any measure of self-defense by responding to the mistaken Iraqi attack. On the other hand, the
United States Navy went to the length of destroying Iranian Oil Platforms in a series of forcible measures taken against Iran. The International Court of Justice in the case between Iran and the United
States on the destruction of the Oil Platforms expressed no sympathy
with United States theory of self-defense. 22
Nicaragua v. U.S.A. (1986) (Military and para-military activities
in and against Nicaragua) amply demonstrated a fundamental lack
of understanding on the part of the United States of the basic principle of international law of collective self-defense, which requires a request of assistance by the victim of an armed attack. In the
Nicaragua Case, the United States could provide no evidence of any
such request. The United States view of international law has been
proven to be inaccurate, but the injury was already inflicted upon innocent victims. The problem remains not only for reparation under
the law of State responsibility, but also civil liability to be discharged
in respect of harms done to individuals in the eyes of international
law as well as under the rules of conflict of laws or private international law.
Questions of liability for tankers on the part of the flag State are
borne out by State practice. The Brussels Conference in the 1970s23
22. ICJ Report (2004) 6 November 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1334 (2003).
23. An International Fund was set up, contributed by States Members to abate
the consequences of oil pollution at sea caused by tankers. Oil pollution of the seas is
regulated by the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea
by Oil, London, 12 May 1954, 12 US T. 2989, TIAG No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3, US is a
Party.
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on the prevention of Oil Pollution from Tankers showed a high degree
of awareness on the part of Maritime States and Sea-faring nations of
the responsibility incumbent upon the flag States to see to it that
tankers flying their flag are in sea-worthy conditions according to international standards of safety. Thus, in 1975, a Japanese tanker of
the Sanko Line, named the Showa Maru, struck some under-water
rocks in the Malacca and Singapore Straits and suffered leakages
which resulted in oil pollution of the Strait States of Malacca and
Singapore Straits (Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia). The Japanese Government took no time to make necessary reparations and
took immediate steps to adopt precautionary measures to prevent
further repetitions of such incidents. An international Committee
was set up to explore ways and means to enhance the safety and security of navigation through the Malacca and Singapore Straits. 24
Civil liabilities attaching to the tankers as well as to their flag States
abound in the annals of maritime transport. The Torrey Canyon 25
and the Prestige 26 have been as notorious as the Exxon Valdez. 27
4.

Protection of the Fishing Fleets and Liabilities of the Flag
State for Violations of Conservation Measures

Not only the United States but also the United Kingdom Governments, had taken upon themselves to protect their fishing fleet at one
time or another. For instance in the fifties, certain Latin American
countries extended their exclusive fishing zones to 200 miles as 'Mar
patrimonial' to conserve and protect the exploitation of living resources, the United States Navy had to escort its tuna fishing fleet to
fish in the proclaimed 'Mar patrimonial' to preempt naval incidents.
The United Kingdom also protected British fishing fleet in the cod
wars off the coast of Norway when Norway enforced its four-miles
territorial sea, and later also with Iceland when the latter proclaimed
an extended exclusive fishing zone of fifty miles. However, after the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea adopted the
1982 Convention with provisions on Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZ), 28 the Reagan Administration issued a Proclamation in 198329
proclaiming United States EEZ, but at the same time denouncing
24. See, for instance, Sompong Sucharitkul, Le Statut Juridique des Detroits de
Malacca et de Singapour, 1994, No. 8, Revue Espaces et Ressources Maritimes,
Universite de Nice, France.
25. The United Kingdom destroyed a tanker without the consent of the flag State.
The Torrey Canyon disaster prompted the adoption of the International Convention
Relating to Intervention on the Highseas in cases of Oil Pollution Casualties 1969, 26
U.S.T. 765, T.I.A.S. No. 8068. The United States is a party to this Convention.
26. The Spanish Government took steps to preempt oil pollution from The Prestige to reach the Spanish coast. This diversion could endanger the French coast.
27. See Gold, Marine Pollution Liability after 'Exxon Valdez': The United States
'AU-or-Nothing Lottery!' 22 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 423 (1991).
28. Part V, Article 55.15 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. UN
Doc. A/CONF.62/122, UN Sales No. E83 V.3.
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United States exclusive possession or control over the highly migratory species, i.e., free-swimming tunas within the United States
EEZs. By so limiting, the United States hoped that it could maintain
a more consistent position when it came to the fishing of highly migratory species by United States tuna fishing fleets inside the EEZ of
the fifteen South Pacific Forum States. This consistent United States
attitude appeared to be in direct conflict with the notion of EEZs
which allowed coastal States to regulate and manage the stocks including migratory species within their EEZ. Kiribati arrested at least
one such United States fishing vessel and refused to release the recalcitrant vessel without posting of appropriate bond.
The United States Government continued to maintain its untenable position, although seeing that Japan had agreed to give financial
and technical assistances to the South Pacific Forum States in return
for licenses for Japanese fishing fleet to fish in their EEZ. The
United States was not persuaded until the Russian started to fish in
the EEZ of these South Pacific nations with legitimate license, having
also given necessary financial assistance together with highly sophisticated fishing technologies to these South Pacific States. 30
Apart from the duty of protection of the fishing fleets, States
have also assumed several obligations under the Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory
fish stocks. Part V of the Convention enumerates the duties of the
flag State. In effect, Article 18 stipulates that 'A State whose vessels
fish on the high seas shall take such measures as may be necessary to
ensure that vessels flying its flag comply with sub-regional and regional conservation and management measures and that such vessels
do not engage in any activities which undermine the effectiveness of
such measures.'31
The measures taken by a State in respect of vessels flying its flag
include control on the high seas by means of fishing licenses, authorizations or permits, in accordance with any applicable procedures
agreed at the sub-regional, regional or global level. 32 A State is
under an obligation not to authorize the use of vessels flying its flag
for fishing on the high sea if it is not able to exercise effectively its
29. President Reagan Proclamation of the US EEZs on 10 March 1983, Proclamation No. 5030, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 600 (1983).
30. See William 0. McLean and Sompong Sucharitkul, Fisheries Management
and Development in the EEZ: The North, South and Southwest Pacific Experience, in
63 NoTRE DAME LAw REVIEW 492 (1988).
31. Article 18 (1) of the Agreement for the Implementation of the provisions of the
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to conservation and management
of straddling stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, adopted 4 August, 1995, opened
for signature, 4 December 1995; 34 ILM1542 (1995).
32. !d., Article 18 (2).
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responsibilities in respect of such vessels under the Convention and
this Agreement. 33 In addition, the flag States are required to establish regulations, to apply terms and conditions to the license, authorization or permit sufficient to fulfill any sub-regional, regional or
global obligations of the flag State, to prohibit fishing on the high
seas for unlicensed or unauthorized vessels, and to require such vessels to carry the license, authorization and permit on board at all
times. 34
These are but a few examples of the duties of the flag State to
take measures to ensure compliance with international regulations
at various levels, sub-regional, regional and global, including detailed
requirements regarding marking of the vessels, fishing gears, timely
reporting of the position of the vessels and the catch of target and
non-target species through such means as observers program, inspection schemes, unloading and monitoring of landed catches and market statistics. 35 The Agreement also provides for international
cooperation in enforcement36 and obligation to prevent and settle disputes by peaceful means. 37 States Parties are required to encourage
non-parties to become parties as well as to take measures to deter the
activities of vessels flying the flag of non-parties which undermine
the effective implementation of this Agreement. 38 State Parties are
responsible and liable for damage or loss attributable to them in regard to this Agreement. 39 While non-parties are not bound by the
provisions of this Agreement, they are liable to have the fishing vessels flying their flag subjected to the rigorous regulation and implementation of fisheries management, and limitations and restrictions.
National and international sanctions are also available. 40
33. Id., Article 18 (3)(a).
34. Id., Article 18 (3)(b), and also to ensure compliance or non-violation of fishing
regulations in areas under national jurisdiction of other States. In a different context,
the case of the Virginius (1873) seems to point to the lack of relevancy whether the
Virginius truly had the right to fly United States flag when it was carrying arms and
ammunition and potential rebels destined for Cuba. The Virginius was captured by a
Spanish man-of-war on the high seas. Among the 53 out of 155 crew members and
passengers summarily condemned for piracy and executed, some were nationals of the
US and the UK. Spain paid compensation for the families of the executed American
and British nationals without the case being referred to arbitration. J. B. Moore's
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 1906, Vol. 2, p. 895.
35. Id., Article 18 (2)(d)(e)(f) and (g).
36. For basic procedures for boarding and inspection, see id. Articles 21 and 22.
37. Id., Part VIII Pacific Settlement of Disputes, Articles 27-32.
38. !d., Part IX, Article 33.
39. Id., Part XI, Article 35.
40. Provisional measures may be and have been prescribed by the Law of the Sea
Tribunal even prior to the preliminary determination of the jurisdictional issues by
the Arbitration Tribunal under Annex VII seized of the matter. See, for instance, the
Blue-fin Tuna Disputes between Australia and Japan; and New Zealand and Japan,
ITLOS REPORT (2003).
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D. Absence of Uniformity in the Requirements for Registration of
Sea-Going Vessels
In the absence of generally accepted criteria for registration of
sea-going vessels so as to qualify them to fly the national flag of a
State, let alone the existence of uniformity in the flagging of ships,
States or flag States could hardly be found responsible or liable for
non-compliance with their own national legislation. Besides, a State
may at any time alter or waive certain conditions or requirements to
enable it to reflag non-national ships and treat them as forming part
of its own national fleet with every right to fly its flag
A brief survey of national requirements of some selected maritime nations may suffice to demonstrate the variations and diversities of national requirements and regulations concerning registration
of ships with license to fly their flag and with necessary legal
implications.
For convenience sake, it is practical in this survey4 1 to examine
classification of ships by States under separate headings, according
to the degree of strict requirements of a genuine link with the flag
State or State of registration, starting from the most stringent requirements of the United States to the least prerequisite of essential
connection, such as Mexico and the States that permit flags of convenience such as Liberia.
1.

The United States of America

To qualify for registration in the United States, different requirements exist for different purposes of registration.
a. Vessels registered in the United States for foreign trade
may be any type, size and age and may have been constructed anywhere. However, they must be owned by a
United States entity, but that entity may be owned up to one
hundred percent in turn by non-citizen interest.
b. Vessels registered in the United States for domestic trade
must be built in the United States and owned by a U.S. entity that is owned no less then 75% by U.S. citizens.
c. Vessels registered in the United States must be inspected
and certified by the U.S. Coast Guard.
d. Vessels registered in the United States must be crewed by
U.S. citizens.
41. This survey is based on an APEC report of 14 February 2000. APEC is an
association of Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation, consisting of East and Southeast
Asian nations, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Mexico, New Zealand as well as Taiwan and USA. The Association is loosely organized, with annual meetings at summit
level, currently with headquarters in Singapore.
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A number of significant amendments, modifications and exceptions have been introduced in the recent past to accommodate new
situations, either for economic, political or strategic reasons. To give
but a few illustrations:
a. The United States reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers during
the Iraq-Iran GulfWar of the 1980s is an example ofthe relaxation of U.S. registration requirements. The tanker need
not be constructed in the United States but must satisfy international standards of safety, not the United States requirements. The reflagging was based on political and
strategic motives as opposed to economic reasons. 42
b. The recent United States change of attitude towards
coastal cruises has led to the relaxation of the requirements
of United States construction for cruise vessels in response
to the demand of the United States market for tourism as a
coastal trade. 43 It was possible for United States entities to
operate foreign-built cruise ships of at least 20,000 gross
tons with capacity of 800 passengers and less than ten year
of age to fulfill the need to enlarge the domestic market
which included visits to U.S. ports along U.S. coasts. This
was subject to the proviso that the foreign-built cruise vessels reflagged as United States vessels were to be gradually
replaced by U.S. built cruise ships. In any event, they are to
be inspected each year according to United States standards.
They are also to be repaired in the United States and maintained by U.S. crew. 44 This stop-gap legislation was based
on economic grounds. Foreign-flagged vessels could operate
in the coast-wise or domestic trade, two voyages per year, as
long as the voyage did not last longer than two weeks, and
either started at one coast of the United States and ended on
the other, or started along one coast of the United States
during a voyage between two countries. Also the Secretary
could approve up to 30 foreign-flagged vessels to be
chartered for 30 days to a non-cruise ship-owning company,
to be used in domestic commerce.
42. See supra section 3 (c) Reflagging of Private-owned Tankers, cited also in The
Iranian Oil Platforms Case, ICJ REPORTS (2003). For a political comments on this
judgment, see Pieter, H.F. Bekker, in 98 A.J.I.L. pp. 550-558. See also Mitra Koohi v.
U.S.A.: Iran Air Flight 655 (3 July 1988, 290 victims) 976 F. 2 d. 1328.
43. See US Cruise Vessel Act 2001, Report of the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 197th Congress, 1st Session, 27 July 2001. Calendar No.
106, 107th Congress Report Senate, 1st Session 107-47.
44. Labor standards are regulated by International Labour Organization (ILO),
while safety standards are implemented by delegation to Coast Guard approved classification societies to provide inspections to meet the safety standards set by the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
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c. The latest United States requirements under the U.S.
Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) were signed
into law by President George W. Bush in November 2002. 45
The new law was motivated by reasons of national security
having regard to the 361 public ports that are operational
through which pass each year approximately 95 per cent of
United States overseas trade, including bulk and containerized cargo. 46 The new legislation was designed to improve
security conditions inter alia, to help identify and track vessels, assess security preparedness and limit access to sensitive areas. The Maritime Transportation Security Act
established a new United States Antiterrorism Maritime
Transportation System to develop an automatic identification device that would enable port officials to determine the
identity and position of vessels 'operating on the navigable
waters of the United States.'4 7
All vessels within certain categories (based on the type and size)
that enter United States ports must install such tracking equipment
by no later than December 2004, although in several United States
ports, the infrastructure for operating the system is not yet in
place. 48 In addition, owners and operators of vessels operating in
United States waters, including foreign vessels, are required to submit for approval to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security a 'Vessel Security Plan' for determining a 'transportation
security incident' to the maximum extent practicable. 49 Unless the
plan is approved, the vessel may not operate in United States waters.
The Secretary is also required to assess the effectiveness of anti-terrorism measures maintained at foreign ports (such as screening of
containerized cargo and restrictions on access to cargo) and to notify
the foreign government if such measures were found ineffective as
well as to recommend steps for improvements. 50
Pending such improvement, the Secretary
a. may prescribe conditions of entry into the United States
for any vessel arriving from that foreign port, or any vessel
carrying cargo or passengers originating from or transshipped through that port;
45. See establishment of U.S. Antiterrorism Maritime Transportation System, Cir
. 98 A.J.I.L. 588 (2004).
46. 46 U.S.C.A. ss. 70101 (West 2004).
47. !d., ss 70114.
48. US General Accounting Office, Maritime Security Progress Made in Implementing Maritime Transportation Security Act, GAO Doc. GA0-3-11551, at 7 (9 Sept.
2003) available at http://www.gao.gov.
49. 46 USCA SS 70103 (c) (1), (2), (3).
50. Id. SS 70103 (c) (4), (5).
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b. may deny entry to the United States to any vessel that
does not meet such condition; and
c. shall provide public notice for passengers of the ineffective
antiterrorism measure.
The Maritime Transportation Security Act also requires the Department of Homeland Security to report to Congress on foreign-flag
vessels calling at United States ports, particularly those with questionable ownership histories. 51 The United States Coast Guard published final regulations on maritime security implementation of the
Maritime Transportation Security Act. 52 Although foreign vessels
from the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) member States need not submit security plans to United States
Government for approval, non-SOLAS foreign vessels are required to
have Coast Guard-approved security plans. 5 3
2.

Thailand

Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (A.D. 1938)54 regulates registration
of sea-going vessels in Thailand on the following criteria:
a. Section 8 requires registration in accordance with type
and size of ships
(1) mechanically-propelled vessels of ten gross tons or
more;
(2) sea-going vessels, not mechanically propelled, of
twenty gross tons or more;
(3) river boats, not mechanically propelled, of fifty gross
tons or more.
b. For fishing in the sea
( 1) mechanically propelled vessels of any size;
(2) vessels, not mechanically propelled, of six gross tons
or more.
c. Ownership and
d. Nationality of owner
Section 7 specifies the need for ownership by Thai nationals.
Section 7 bis reduces the required percentage from 70 to 50
in case of a limited company and a public company limited
51. MTSA 46 USCA s. 112. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) was
also pursuing a similar initiative. The IMO decided to adopt new regulations to enhance ship and port security, especially from international terrorism. A new 'International Ship and Port Facility Security Code' (ISPS Code) was adopted, IMO Doc.
SOLAS/CONF.5/32, Annex (12 Dec. 2002). Part A is mandatory, while Part B is recommended as guidance for implementation of the ISPS Code.
52. 22 Oct. 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. 60, 448, at 60, 459.
53. The Coast Guard estimates the cost of implementation to be at US$ 1.5 billion
for the first year at US$ 7.3 billion for the decade to come.
54. Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (A.D. 1938), promulgated in Government Gazette
B.E. 2481. cited from APEC Report 2000.
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with capital and paid up capital 50 per cent owned by Thai
nationals for a registered Thai vessel trading with foreign
countries and not in Thai waters.
e. Control
Section 31 provides for the transfer of a registered Thai vessel to a person qualified to own a Thai vessel under section 7
within 90 days from the date of acquisition by unqualified
person or from the date of disqualification of the original
owner.
f. Place of construction
There is no restriction for a ship to be built in Thailand or
anywhere else.
g. Nationality of crew
Ministerial Regulation No. 8 (1997) issued under the Thai
Vessels Act B.E. 2481 requires at least half of the crew to be
Thai nationals for a Thai-flagged vessel in international
trade. This requirement may be reduced to 10 per cent of
the crew with Thai nationality in case of inability of the
ship-owner to hire Thai nationals.
f. Certification
Several types of certificate may be issued according to Ship
Survey Regulation No. 23 (1986) for Coastal Trade and Interna-tional Trade.
3.

Hong Kong

A set of regulations has been introduced to improve registration
procedures for Hong Kong shipping Register. 55 The new Merchant
Shipping Registration Amendment 2001 is part of Hong Kong's ongoing efforts to streamline ship registration procedures in Hong
Kong. To proceed from one port to another, a ship must carry on
board a certificate of registry issued by the flag administration.
When a ship is reflagged, Hong Kong requires the original title document to process a provisional ship registration. This period is reduced from three to one month. The tonnage charge has also been
reduced correspondingly. This is part of the continuing efforts to enhance the attractiveness of the Hong Kong registry which now numbers some 581 vessels totaling 10.71 million gross tons. Otherwise, a
Hong Kong ship must comply with safety requirements of the IMO,
SOLAS, MARPOL, Load Line, STCW, etc. Ownership or representation by qualified persons is necessary, otherwise there are no limitations on the type, size, age, control, nationality of crew, etc.
55. Report from the Xinhua News Agency, (also www:marinelog.xorg/DOC/NEWS
SMMIIMMID Feb 09.htm).
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Taiwan

Taiwan's Evergreen Maritime Co. announced on 4 February
2002 56 that it would reflag more than half of its container vessels as
British and Italian to facilitate its business with China. The purpose
of Evergreen reflagging its ships is also to reduce optional costs, such
as insurance cost, especially war-insurance risk. The war-insurance
premiums for global sea and air transportation have increased
sharply since the 9:11 Terrorist Attacks. As the United Kingdom is a
traditional sea super power in marine insurance with Lloyds of
London, Evergreen could reach an agreement on the insurance premium with the United Kingdom before changing the registration of
its fleet. But the real purpose for this move is for Evergreen to expand its market. The recent purchase of an Italian shipping firm was
a first step in entering the European market. Taiwan also had an eye
on new cruise vessels to be constructed in Taronto City to develop
cruise ships industry in the Mediterranean.
Crew certificate requirements follow international practice such
as STCW Convention. There is also maximum age allowable for importation of existing ships into Taiwan. Taiwanese flags suffer the
disadvantage of lacking a general or universal recognition, but the
effective business management of its maritime fleet flagged or reflagged clearly made up for its political handicaps. 57
5.

China

To be registered in China, vessels must be owned by Chinese nationals or companies. A ship forming part of a Sino-foreign joint venture must have at least fifty per cent of capital investment on the
Chinese side. Chinese flagged vessels must be managed by Chinese
nationals. Whenever it is necessary to recruit foreign sea-farers,
their employment has to be approved by the competent authority of
the transport and communication under the State Council. But there
is no restriction on the type, size and construction of the ship. 5 8
6.

Singapore

To give effect to the Hague-Visby Rules, Singapore amended its
1995 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) in 1997. 59 The legisla56. Report by Yang Chang-Cheng, Associate Professor at the Dept of Shipping
and Transportation Management at the China College of Marine Technology and
Commerce.
57. There has been no need for Taiwan to change the registration of its EVA air
fleet, nor China Airline for that matter.
58. See the APEC report 2000, cited in note 54 above. See also Order of the President of the People's Republic of China No. 28, promulgated on 25 Dec. 1999, entered
into force on 1 July 2000: Maritime Procedure Law of the Peoples' Republic of China.
59. Id., see in particular, the decision of Singapore Court of Appeal in Sunlight
Mercantile Pte, Ltd. v. Ever Lucky Shiping Co., Ltd. [2004] 1 SLR 171, holding that a

2006]

LIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF REGISTRATION

427

tive technique was modeled after the United Kingdom 1924 Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act which gave effect to the Hague Rules. The
amendment was meant to fill one lacuna in cases where the contract
of carriage albeit governed by Singapore law would not attract the
mandatory application of the Hague-Visby Rules, such as the port of
shipment being non-Singapore.
Only Singapore citizens or permanent residents or companies incorporated in Singapore can be registered owner of Singapore ships.
A company registered in Singapore with one hundred percent foreign
shareholders can register a Singapore ship. The size required is at
least 1,600 gross tons and self-propelled.
The vessel may be surveyed by the survey or by any of the classification societies authorized by the Maritime Port Authority. Owners
of ships above seventeen years are required to submit a special report
on the condition of the ship issued by one of the authorized classification societies.
7.

Japan

Japanese vessels are defined as ships which have been granted
the right to fly the Japanese flag, 60 including
a. Ships owned by the Government of Japan or a Japanese
Public Office;
b. Ships owned by Japanese nationals; and
c. Ships owned by a legal entity with principal office located
in Japan, and all of their representatives are Japanese nationals. This may be subject to additional qualification that
more than two thirds of their representatives must be J apanese nationals. There are no other requirements or
restrictions.
8.

Korea

Any vessels over 20 gross tons can be registered as a Korean vessel under Korean Vessel Registration Act. 61 Foreign-owned company
registered in Korea under relevant laws of the Republic of Korea may
operate a Korean flagged vessel. The majority of the investors must
be Korean and three fifths of the voting rights of the directors must
belong to Korean. The directors representing the company must be a
Korean national. The ownership requirement is being revised, so as
clause in Bills of Lading excluding liability of ship-owner for any loss or damage ''howsoever" caused or arising was not sufficient to exonerate it, where the general average
incident was caused by unseaworthiness. York-Antwerp Rules 1974.
60. I d., see also Article 3 of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport
(MLIT) Establishment Law, 2001, setting out MLIT Bureau Activities.
61. Id.
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to allow a Korean registered commercial company to own a Korean
vessel without limitation as to nationality of shareholders or coowners.
9.

Mexico

There are no restrictions on vessels registration. Only vessels
with Mexican flag must have Mexican crew. 62 All vessels are required to comply with international conventions.
10.

Indonesia

A vessel of 7 gross tons or more may be registered in Indonesia
and allowed to fly Indonesian flag. It has to be owned by Indonesian
citizens or companies incorporated in Indonesia. 63
11.

Philippines

The Philippines requires all entities wishing to engage in overseas shipping, specially ship owning and ship chartering must be registered and accredited with the MARINA. 64 Only Philippines
national entity may be so accredited (60 - 40 per cent Philippine foreign equity.) Chartered ships may be registered under Philippines
flag (a) with at least 60 - 40 Philippine equity participation; (b)
with 100 per cent Philippine crew; and (d) with complete compliance
with IMO Safety and Marine Pollution Prevention Conventions. 65
12.

Liberia (Flag of convenience)

For vessels owned by a Liberian company, existing owners who
wish to reflag will have to redomicile the owning company to another
company or transfer ownership to a non-Liberian company's place of
incorporation. Not all countries allows redomiciliation, Hong Kong
and Singapore do not allow it. A Liberian company could redomicile
to Panama, (another flag of convenience), Marshall Islands, British
Virgin Islands or Bermuda. 66
Another issue relates to the mortgage or remortgage of a ship to
the owner's bank. A Liberian mortgage cannot automatically be registered elsewhere without amendment.
Moreover, the owner may have to obtain charterer's consent to
changing flag and sufficient time should be allowed to obtain this
consent and agreement on the new registry for the vessel. In addition, the owner may need new trading certificates from a classifica62.
63.
64.
65.
ments
66.

Id.
Id.
See Memorandum Circular Nos. 330-A and 42-A.
See Presidential Decree 866, Amending PD 760. Other international instruinclude the 1978 STCW Convention, as amended and the I.S.A. Code.
See APEC Report 2000, cited in note 54 above.
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tion society approved by the new flag State. The insurance will have
to be notified of the transfer. Officers and crew may also require licenses from the new flag State. These items will doubtless incur
costs.

E. APEC Concerns for Ships Engaged in International Voyages
Having regard to the casualties suffered by United States vessels
of various types, it is not surprising that the United States authorities have been most vigilant to safeguard freedom of navigation and
to secure safe passage for international maritime transport. This
concern is shared by most sea-faring nations on a world-wide or
global basis67 as well as at inter-regional, multi-regional, regional
and sub-regional levels.
The current study is singling out one multi-regional model,
APEC, as a tri-regional association of East and Southeast Asian nations together with Australia and New Zealand and the Pacific nations, including the United States of America, North and South
American States bordering the Eastern Pacific Ocean, including Canada, Mexico, Chile and Peru.
APEC plans to protect ships engaged in international voyages by
promoting ship and port security plans and installation of automatic
identification systems by the end of 2004. Enhancing cooperation on
fighting piracy in the region within APEC fora and organizations
such as the International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre
and International Maritime Organization will be next on the agenda
of measures to protect ships on international voyages.
APEC members have been cooperating to strengthen border security through enhanced supply chain of security guidelines. These
non-binding guidelines are business friendly and are being used by
the private sector to reinforce their supply chain security practices.
The APEC Transportation Working Group is also developing standards for detection equipment and other security technology. The Accreditation of Seafarer Manning Agencies in the APEC tri-regional
project plans to devise a system for accrediting manning agents to
provide secure employees to maritime companies in the Asia-Pacific
Region. The APEC Transportation Work Group is also supporting
the development and use oflntelligent Transportation Systems (ITS),
involving the use of electronic cargo seals and sensors, increased efficiency in inspecting seals, the use of electronic cargo manifests and
Global Navigational Satellite Systems.
67. On the global scale, a new 'International Ship and Port Facility Security Code'
(ISPS Code), IMO. Doc. SOLAS/CONF.5/34, Annex 1 (12 Dec. 2002). IMO will publish a 'White List' of vessels issued an 'International Ship Security Certificate' (ISSC)
by authorized shipping societies.

430

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 54

To implement Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) initiative, APEC leaders agreed to secure and enhance the flow of goods
and people through measures to protect cargo, ships, international
aviation68 and people in transit.
STAR I
The first Secure Trade for APEC Region (STAR) Conference was
held in Bangkok on 23-25 February 2003, co-hosted by Thailand and
the United States with 21 APEC Members in attendance and participating as well as officials from international organizations such as
the IMO, IATA, 69 World Custom Organization (WCO) and the world
Bank, not to mention senior executives from major private sector
companies affected to discuss how to advance trade efficiency and
trade security in the Asia-Pacific Region. Participants agreed that
investment in security can deliver significant economic returns, by
reducing the economic costs of terrorism prevention and by facilitating freer movement of goods and people.
As a follow-up to STAR I initiative, Thailand and the United
States developed a demonstration project, the STAR-Bangkok/Laem
Chabang Efficient and Secure Trade (BEST) Port, using e-seal technology to track shipments of secured containers via satellite from the
Port of Laem Chabang to the Port of Seattle.
This constituted a show of solidarity in collective responsibility
to enhance the confidence of exporters and consumers in the security
of the region's supply chain.
STAR II
Chile hosted the second STAR Conference from 4-6 March 2004.
The agenda covered topics of maritime security, air transportation
security, 70 the mobility of people and measures to prevent terrorist
financing. APEC members agreed to implement new security measures to ensure more stable economic environment through effective
collective collaboration between public and private sectors and sharing of information and responsibility between APEC Governments.
There were some concerns nonetheless regarding the impact that security measures could have on trade facilitation. A global approach is
vital and that the tri-regional initiative should be globalized.
It was agreed that APEC economies need to have an operational
financial intelligence unit to prevent terrorist financing and to
counter money laundering for terrorist financing.
68. For international aviation, see the section on Air Law below.
69. International Air Transport Association. This is vital for international civil
aviation.
70. See further detailed discussion in the ensuing section below.
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Conclusion

This study may serve to demonstrate the lack of uniformity in
the various national legal systems regarding the requirements for a
State to register a vessel under its flag. The test of the closest link or
connection need not depend on the place of construction or qualified
percentage of ownership by nationals, or of the equity in an owning
entity. What appears to be decisive is the willingness of the State to
consider a sea-worthy vessel qualified to fly its flag, and hence worthy of its protection. The flag State or State of registration carries
with it the authority to apply and enforce its law. On the other hand,
it equally entails the liability and responsibility of protection, which
today has become a matter of common concern not only for individual
responsibility of each flag State but for the collective and shared responsibility of the maritime trading nations and the entire global
community ideally to police if not patrol the oceans.
Any serious study of comparative legal systems on the issues
under review will have to bear in mind the ultimate common interest
of mankind in the safety of life at sea and in the free and secure
movement of goods and people across the oceans, not unmindful of
the ever constant state of evolution in which the applicable rule of
international law on any controversial issue is finding itself.

III.

A.

AIR

LAW

General Observations

For Present purposes, AIR LAW means international civil and
commercial aviation law, otherwise known as Air Transport Law,
and not the quality of the air as in international environmental law.
The present study of Air Law provides a more or less exact counterpart parallel to Maritime Law in the preceding section. While no attempt will be made to relate or restate the evolution of civil aviation
law based on legal developments of Maritime Law, the current inquiry is confined to a very few points of special interest from comparative law perspective. To an appreciable extent, efforts will be made
to underline a potential and likely reproduction of a parallel evolution of maritime rules in international air transport law, as reflected
in the adoption of corresponding rules in aviation law or domestic air
transport law of national legal systems.
In historical perspective, legal development in domestic and international air transport has not always followed the exact path of
legal development in maritime law. The high seas or open seas were
relatively free, and indeed most international sea ports have always
been open to ships of all flags for international trade. The highways
of the skies were known to be comparatively unfree, due in no small
measure to the exclusive domain of territorial airspace. Each of the
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traffic rights, from the third to the sixth freedoms, had to be negotiated and bilateral agreements successfully reached to initiate the operation of international air services. Multilateral Conventions, such
as the Chicago Convention 194471 was inadequate to ensure free
movement of passengers and goods by air. Except for the right of
over-flight and the right to land and refuel (fist and second freedoms),
no traffic rights were automatically accorded. The United States policy of 'open skies' for international aviation was only an American
dream in the 1940s.
In recent years, renewed efforts have been launched to initiate
bilateral air-services arrangements on a revised model of 'open skies'
or 'mixed open skies package'. Recent attempts have met with some
measure of success, notably the agreements between the United
States and Canada, and with the United Kingdom and a number of
European NATO partners of the United States. This has not escaped
the watchful eye of the European Community. The European Commission raised the question with the European Court of Justice in the
series of cases in 1998, 72 involving inter alia, the question of the need
for the Community to renegotiate a new 'mixed open skies package'
Air Service Agreements with the United States to replace the existing eight bilateral agreements concluded by the United Kingdom
and several other Community members. For the Community, the intra-Community routes had been reserved almost as 'Cabotage' for
Community national carriers. Special provisions will have to be
made on the analogy of the provisional stop-gap adopted by the
United States Administration in connection with the reflagging of
foreign-built cruise vessels to operate in coastwise and domestic trade
off the United States coasts. 73

B.

Similarities and Dissimilarities in Legal Development

To proceed from a study of the law of maritime transport to that
of civil air transport, some similarities deserve the closest attention,
having regard to the dissimilarities in the conditions and capacities
of maritime and air transport.

71. Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, 7 Dec. 1944, T.I.A.S.
1951; 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
72. See Commission u. U.K, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Luxemburg,
Austria and Germany, E.C.J. 5 Nov. 2002, cases C-466/98-469/98; C-471/98-474/98;
C-475/98-476/98; 2002 E.C.J. I-9427. The Council has authorized the Commission to
renegotiate a series of mixed open-skies Agreements with the United States, New
Zealand and Singapore to correct the respective bilateral Air Services Agreements on
the basis of the horizontal mandate. See EC Regulation 847/2004 of European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004.
73. See the US Cruise Vessel Act, 2001, cited in note 43 above.
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Piracy Jure Gentium and Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft in
Flight

For one thing, the perils of the seas and the bottomless oceans
are not dissimilar from the hazards of the skies. Piracy became the
first known offense against the law of nations, recognized as such in
most penal codes as well as in customary international law. The classic definition of piracy jure gentium embracing the existence of a pirate ship to capture a victim ship may seem outmoded. Nonetheless,
the treatment of pirates as hastes generis humani (enemies of mankind) appears to have retained its raison d'etre today as much as ever
before when it was originally introduced. The transplantation of the
concept of 'piracy' into international air law would seem unreal, if not
incomplete. There is no need for a 'pirate aircraft' to capture and
board a 'victim aircraft' in mid-air in mid-flight. Development in international aviation law has been in the limitation of liabilities of air
carriers as foreshadowed in the original Warsaw Convention 1929. 74
Offenses on board an aircraft had not attracted much attention until
the Tokyo Convention of 1963. 75 The problem of hijacking of aircraft
came to a head in the Hague Convention on the Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft in Flight 1970.76
2. Terror on the High Seas and in the Skies
The maritime incident of the Achille Lauro 77 in the Mediterranean in the mid-eighties involving unlawful seizure of an Italian
cruise vessel by terrorists who boarded the ship as passengers in a
North Mrican Mediterranean port could scarcely be characterized as
'piracy' for want of another ship known as a pirate ship or even an
aircraft. The horror that befell the Achille Lauro resulted in one
American ex-serviceman killed by being thrown overboard. Subsequently, the United States took occasion to intercept an Egypt Air
flight carrying some of the alleged terrorists involved in the incident
and caused them to be landed in a military airfield in Sicily. 78 While
the United States request for extradition was not favorably received
by the Italian authorities who resorted to the option aut dedere aut
74. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 Dec. 1929, copy available at www.lexmercatoria.org, Hague Protocol, 28 Sept. 1955, ICAO Doc. 7632, and protocol No. 4
Montreal, 1975, ICAO Doc. 9148. Compare the UN Convention on the Carriage of
Goods by Sea, 1978, Hamburg.
75. 14 Sept 1963; 20 U.S.T. 2941; 704 .U.N.T.S. 219 (Tokyo Convention).
76. 16 Dec. 1970; 20 U.S.T. 1641; 10 I.L.M. 113 (Hague Convention).
77. The Achille Lauro was an Italian cruise vessel, flying Italian flag, with an
Italian crew, but with passengers from the Mediterranean ports. Compare also the
destruction of the Rainbow Warrior.
78. US fighters, based on Israeli intelligence, intercepted an Egypt Air flight over
the Mediterranean and escorted it to land at the military facilities near Palermo in
Sicily.
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judicare, by prosecuting some and releasing others. 79 This incident
seems pertinent to the current comparative study as it also relates to
maritime as well as air transport law, as it relates to sea-jacking after lawful boarding and also to air interception. The lesson from the
Achille Lauro Incident could lead to a review of the traditional concept of piracy to include unlawful seizure of ship in voyage in addition
to the seizure of aircraft in flight. Legal developments have taken a
long stride from the mid-eighties to prepare a proper procedure to
prevent 'terror in the skies' as 'on the high seas.'
Clearly, there have been innumerable instances of 'terror in the
skies' involving United States commercial airlines. The international
communities responded with the adoption of a series of International
Conventions. 80
3.

Quarantine or Maritime Interdiction and Aerial
Interception to Prevent Impending Armed Attacks
by Weapons of Destruction

It is noteworthy that in a very limited area of maritime and air
law, in the context of an extended notion of self-defense, individual
and collective, the United States position may have been far ahead of
other nations.
The incidents of September 11, 2001 certainly opened up new
frontiers for legal development in international air and maritime law.
It should be recalled that President John F. Kennedy in 1962 81 initiated fresh developments in the law of 'Quarantine' or 'interdiction
Line' aiming to put a stop to the shipment of materiel de guerre to
that 'imprisoned island.' That initiative produced the salutary result
of modifying the existing rules of ocean law.
A new rule of international law was born overnight, not without
a sacrifice. 82 The same could be said of President George W. Bush's
innovation in announcing the United States intention to shoot down
any aircraft (with or without US registration) which has been unlawfully seized and converted into a weapon of destruction against
targets in the United States. This declaration of intent was a bold
step taken not lightly but with mature deliberation by the Bush Ad79. The US extradition request predated the Anti-Terrorism Act 1986. It was not
explicitly based on the passive nationality principle.
80. In addition to the Tokyo Convention (1963) and the Hague Convention (1970)
cited in Notes 75 and 76 above, the Montreal Convention (1971) should be listed: Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 23
Sept. 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 10 I.L.M. 1151 (The Montreal Sabotage Convention).
81. This interdiction was proclaimed as 'Quarantine' and explained to the UN Security Council as and when events were taking place in 1962. See Abram Chayes,
Law and the Quarantine of Cuba, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1963, at 550-554.
82. The opening of the first hot line communication between President Kennedy
and Chairman Krushev succeeded in establishing a cooling off period and mutual
agreement to dismantle missiles sites in Cuba and in Turkey.
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ministration, having regard to the prevailing contrary rule of international air law, 83 and against the background of Article 3 bis (a) of
the Protocol of 10 May 1984.
4.

Shared Responsibility for Policing the High Seas and Air
Space

The preceding contribution of the United States has left an indelible mark in the making of rules of international law in the field of
maritime and air transport.
Indeed, new pertinent rules are being made by operation of
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) which in May 2003 84 comprises
fifteen nations : Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore,
Spain the United Kingdom and the United States. These countries
have agreed not to traffic in missiles and WMD themselves and also
to adopt measures to cooperate in the search and seizure of suspect
vessels flying the flags of participating States and searching of foreign vessels entering their ports, denying transit rights to suspect
aircraft, and requiring such plane that enter to land for inspection.
Besides Denmark and Turkey, sixty other nations have intimated
their agreement to cooperate on an ad hoc basis, if such a suspect
vessel or aircraft enters their territorial waters or airspace. 85
Thus far, 'operational experts' have held several meetings, most
recently in Washington and Ottawa. They have agreed to exchange
information concerning suspected proliferation of WMD, to review
and strengthen their national laws, and to undertake a number of
interdiction measures. 8 6
83. President Bush made this declaration as Commander-in-Chief of the United
States. See Richard Gardner, Neither Bush nor the Jurisprudence, 97 A.J.I.L. 585,
587 (2003). See also ICAO Declaration on Misuse of Civil Aircraft as Weapons of Destruction and other Terrorist Acts involving Civil Aviation, 5 Oct. 2001, 411.L.M. 501
(2002).
84. See Michael Byes, Policing the High Seas: the Proliferation Security Initiative,
in 98 A.J.I.L. 526, 528 (2004). US and Liberia agreed to accord each other the right,
on the high seas, to board, search, detain, and seize cargo of any vessel reasonably
suspected of trafficking in missiles or WMD, 11 Feb. 2004, available at http://www.
state.gov/t/np/trty/32403.htm.
85. In December 2002, Spanish Marines boarded the So San, a North Korean
freighter crossing the Arabian Sea with hidden fifteen Scud missiles, purchased by
Yemen. In September 2003, a German-owned freighter, the BBC China was heading
for Libya laden with thousands of centrifuges that could be used to enrich Uranium.
The cargo was seized and somehow Libya was persuaded to abandon its WMD
programs.
86. See Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles, 4
Sept. 2003, State Dept. See also Israeli practice concerning high seas interdiction of
weapon-laden vessels, most notably the January 2002 seizure of the Karin A, an
Iraqi-flagged ship in the Red Sea with some fifty tons of Iranian weaponry, including
Katyusha rockets, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.
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5. APEC Continuing Concerns for Air Transport Security
APEC has shown deep concerns for the safety of ships in international voyages, 87 in the same way APEC STAR initiative in enhancing the safety and security of airline passengers and crew. APEC
members have agreed to introduce highly effective screening procedures and equipment at all APEC international airports within this
year 2005. 88 Programs are designed to assist members to meet international safety standards and to ensure that aviation personnel receive proper training with the necessary resources to carry out their
responsibilities.
APEC group on air transportation welcomed the measures implemented by airlines to protect passengers, personnel and passengers' belongings, air transport being a major component of trade and
development in the Asian Pacific region. Further measures are
needed to deliver an effective approach to air transport security in
the APEC region. These should include the training of the personnel
to monitor suspicious activities and report incidents, cargo security
programs to ensure the legitimacy of shippers, in cargo data validation systems, and identification of high risk cargo by means of effective canine detection services, enhanced risk assessment
methodologies and the use of air marshals to prevent international
terrorism.
Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) continue to be a
genuine asset to international commercial aviation. Strict controls
on the export and transfer of missiles and timely exchange of information among APEC members on MANPADS threats could provide
the most effective measures to prevent possible missiles attacks.

C.

Liability and Responsibility of the State of Registration

From the United States vantage point, an armed attack against
an American aircraft, civil or military, is no different from an armed
attack against an American-flagged vessel, merchantman or men-ofwar alike. It is considered to be an attack against the United States
itself, which may induce or provoke responsive measures of self-defense. The present study is designed to illustrate the precise extent
of liability and responsibility of the State of registration of aircraft of
any type.
The relevance of a warranty of airworthiness is more apparent
than real. A certificate of sea-worthiness of a sea-going vessel may
serve a meaningful purpose. But an aircraft has a shorter life span
depending on the length and frequency of its service. The at87. See the preceding Section above in ss. 5 APEC Concerns for the Safety of
Ships Engaged in International Voyages.
88. For instance, the new Thai Airport Suvarnabhumi, is currently being fitted
with 26 units of the latest model of the screening detector equipment.
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tributability to the State of registration for any inspection or survey
of an aircraft or a ship for the purpose of issuance of a certificate of
'seaworthiness' or 'airworthiness' is of limited relevancy in cases
where it would engage the liability of the 'classification societies' or
'aeronautics board or committee', which liability is in turn imputed or
attributed to the State of registration or the flag State, as the case
may be.
What is by far of greater practical interest and pertinence appears to be the liability and responsibility of the State of registration
for the activities or conduct of the aircraft.
Failure on the part of the State to enact effective law to control
aircraft registered in the State may engage State responsibility. No
vicarious liability is directly attached to the State of registration, the
owner and/or operator of the aircraft is liable for the loss incurred.
In most cases, for civil and commercial air transport, a carrier is
answerable for taking an insurance against the risk of aerial accident. Passengers and cargo-owners could also take additional insurance, while the insurance companies in turn may take further
reinsurances. Thus, the State of registration is rarely found primarily liable or responsible for any loss resulting from misconduct or
willful conduct of the cockpit crew. Product liability may be attributable to the manufacturer of the defective parts accountable for the
mishap. The main concern of the State of registration is confined to
the duty of protection and safety of aircraft under its national registration. This includes precautionary measures to prevent acts of terrorism against the aircraft, the responsibility primarily resting on
the State of registration but is also shared by all members of the
global community to ensure to safety and security of air transport in
no way dissimilar from the efforts displayed by flag States for safety
of life at sea (SOLAS).
In contrast to the liabilities of carriers which are limited by the
Warsaw system now undergoing some review, the United States is
not seeking to limit its responsibility to take all measures necessary
to prevent an armed attack by flying object. 89

D.

Conclusion

Air transport requires as much vigilance if not indeed more sophisticated mechanisms than what is expected in maritime transport, not only against acts of terror and attacks or explosion and total
destruction of the aircraft, but also as recent events reveal the need
to take preventive measures against possible conversion of unlaw89. Compare the limitation of liabilities of carriers in Maritime Transport under
various rules, such as Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg (1978). The United States
is prepared to extend the responsibility of the flag State in the context of its duty to
cooperate with other flag States to suppress acts of terrorism on the high seas.
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fully seized aircraft into a weapon of destruction, complete with the
fuel on its way to hit designated targets on the ground or tall buildings in mid air. The risk of terrorist attack not only against an aircraft in flight itself, but also by the use of unlawfully seized aircraft
as means of delivery of a weapon of destruction against pre-selected
targets on the surface. All States are expected to contribute their individual and collective efforts to preempt the recurrence of the events
of 9:11. This is a truly collective responsibility to be shared by all.
Each State is in turn a State of registration without being itself a
maker or builder of any aircraft.
IV.
A.

OuTER SPACE LAw

General Notions

Space law or international law governing the peaceful use of
outer space can in some way be regarded as an outstretch of international aviation law or an extension of air law. Aeronautically, however, flight in outer space is not winged flight for lack of air support.
Thus, the law of outer space owes its origin to the start of the flight
into space, which has to begin from surface through territorial air
space very often of more than one jurisdiction around the globe before
a satellite or a space object reaches its orbital level of altitude. Another confusing yardstick in the assessment of the speed or velocity of
a space vehicle and the distance or altitude to attain may further
compound the confusion by the use or double use of mileage, namely,
surface mile and nautical mile, and the use of the metric system as
the more regular method of measuring the distance in outer space.
This inevitable confusion may result in miscalculations of the exact
distance to a given destination in outer space, and may actually cause
some tragic accidents, over-shooting of the target or other shortcomings. One last notion to be mentioned is the absence of a clear-cut
dividing line between air space and outer space, which may be only
be roughly calculated from the lowest orbit or perigee of about 110
kilometers above ground surface. This imprecise border line necessarily serves to blend the application of air law with outer space law,
using common overlapping principles as a space vehicle travels
through the upper limits of territorial air space or traversing the
space barriers. 9 0
90. See SoMPONG SucHARITKUL, THE BENEFITS oF SPACE AcTIVITIEs FOR AsiAN
CouNTRIES (1992), Golden Gate University; Reprint from the proceedings: "The Highways of Air Space and Outer Space over Asia," International Institute of Air and
Space Law, Leiden University, (Pablo Mendes de Leon ed., 1992). See also Kosmo,

The Commercialization of Space: A Regulatory Scheme that Promotes Commercial
Space Ventures and International Responsibilities, 61 SouTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, 1059 (1988); C. Christol, The 1986 Remote Sensing Principles: Emerging or Existing Law? PRocEEDINGS OF THE 13TH CoLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OuTER SPACE 289
(1987).
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In this context, the 'open skies' policy as applied to outer space
law has become a living reality, thanks to the penetrating vision of
countless viewing satellites orbiting the earth.
B.

Collective Efforts to Regulate the Exploration and Peaceful Use
of Outer Space

The time has come for effective international control mechanisms to be put in place to regulate the exploration and peaceful use
of outer space. 91 These are included in a series of declarations of
principles adopted by United Nations General Assembly Resolutions
beginning from 1962 with The Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 92 the Principles
Governing the Use by States of Artificial Satellites for International
Direct Broadcasting (1982), 93 the Principles Relating to Remote
Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space (1986), 94 the Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space (1992), 95
and the Declaration on International Cooperation on the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All
States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing
Countries (1996).96
The corpus juris governing outer space is embodied in another
series of United Nations Treaties, beginning with the Outer Space
Treaties (1967), 97 the Agreement on the Rescue and Return of Astronauts and Space Objects (1968), 98 and ending up with the Moon
Treaty (1979). 99 The crux of the substantive law pertaining to the
liability and responsibility of the State of registration under review
can be found in two successive Conventions, namely, the Convention
on Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1971) 100 and the
91. See U.N. Treaties and Principles on Outer Space, a commemorative edition
published on the occasion of the Third U.N. Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Use of Outer Space (UNISPACE III) A/AC.1051722, A/CONF. 184.
92. G.A. Res. 1962 (1963).
93. G.A. Res. 37/92 (1982).
94. G.A. Res. 41/165 (1986).
95. G.A. Res. 47/68 (1992).
96. G.A. Res. 51/122 (1996).
97. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies. G.A. Res.
2222 (XXI) Annex, adopted on 19 Dec, 1966, opened for signature on 27 Jan. 1967 and
entered into force on 10 Oct. 1967,
98. The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, G.A. Res. 2345 (XXII) Annex,
adopted on 19 Dec, 1967, opened for signature on 22 April1968 and entered into force
on 3 Dec. 1968.
99. The Agreement Governing the Activities of the States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, G.A. Res. 34/68 Annex, adopted on 5 Dec. 1979, opened for signature
on 18 Dec. 1979 and entered into force on 11 July 1984.
100. The Liability Convention, G.A. Res. 2777 (XXVI) Annex, adopted on 29 Dec,
1971, opened for signature on 29 Mar. 1972 and entered into force on 1 Sept. 1972.
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Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space
(1974). 101 Although chronologically the Registration Convention
should have preceded the Liability Convention, but once the Liability
Convention was adopted, the impelling need for registration became
apparent.

C.

Liability and Responsibility of the State of Registration

For space objects, more than for vessels and aircraft, the liability
of national registry agencies is indubitably imputable if not readily
attributed to the State of registration. The State stands liable for
whatever harm, injury or loss caused by any registered objects
launched into space. The law of outer space has developed a more
sophisticated set of criteria to determine multiple liabilities which
are based on joint and several responsibilities of every State connected with the launching process of a space object, most certain of
all the State of Registration. The 'space object' includes artificial
satellites, space stations, as well as space and launch vehicles.
1.

The 'State of Registration' and the 'Launching State'

Simple enough, a 'State of Registration' may be defined as the
State that registers the space object in question. However, further
inquiry has to be made as to the duty to register, or rather which of
the States among the launching States should bear the responsibility
of registering an object launched into outer space. Article II (2) ofthe
Registration Convention provides a clue to the solution to this
enigma.
"(2) Where there are two or more States in respect of any

such space object, they shall jointly determine which one of
them shall register the object in accordance with paragraph
1 of this Article, bearing in mine the provisions of Article
VIII of the Outer Space Treaty) and without prejudice to appropriate agreements concluded among the launching States
on jurisdiction and control over the space object and over any
personnel thereof."l02
In this context, it should be noted that the term 'space object'
includes component parts of a space object as well as the launch vehicle in accordance with Article II. 103 The multiple choice to be made
101. The Registration Convention, G.A. Res. 3235 (XXIX) Annex, adopted on 12
Nov. 1974, opened for signature on 14 Jan. 1975 and entered into force on 15 Sept.
1976.
102. See Article II (1) and (2) of the Convention on Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space, cited in note 126 above.
103. Id., Article I (b) definition of a space object.
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for the State of registration is dictated by the plurality of the meanings of the term 'launching State', which includes under Article I (a)
a. A State which launches or procures the launching of a space
object; and
b. A State from whose territory or facility a space object is
launched. 104
This does not preclude the launching of a space object by an international organization, such as the United Nations or a regional
organization such as the European Space Agency (ESA). The complexity of this multiplicity of launchers and international legal personalities responsible for registration may thereby be further
compounded. Supplementary agreements between launching States
and/or launching institutions may help clarify the respective rights
and obligations as well as joint and several liabilities of the various
partners in the common or joint venture. In the ultimate analysis, it
is the collective will of the launching States that determines the precise nature and contents as well as the extent of the rights and obligations of each individual partner in the launching of the space
object.
2.

Multiple Standards of Liability of the Launching States

Apart from the multiplicity and joint or several liabilities of the
launching States, although only one of which serves as the State of
registration, the outer space regime has to work out a practical solution for the apportionment of liabilities in terms of proportionality of
faults or risks or in terms of priority of claims by the injured parties,
and the respective primary or residual responsibility of the launching
partners. Thus far, the provisions of the Liability Convention appear
to suggest a solution of joint and several liabilities with possible apportionment of the compensation to be paid with possible eventual
recovery from other partners.
The outer space regime provides two types of liability for the
launching States, individual and collective, joint and several. In the
first place, the launching States are liable absolutely, i.e., without
proof of fault for the damage caused by their space object to the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight. 105 Article II of the Liability
Convention provides for 'absolute liability' for damage caused (1) to
the surface of the Earth; and (2) to the aircraft in flight within the
Earth air space.
Article III of the Liability Convention provides for 'liability based
on fault' in the event of damage caused elsewhere than on the surface
of the Earth to a space object of one launching State or to persons or
104. Id., Article I (a) definition of a launching State. Compare Article I (c) of the
Liability Convention (1972) cited in note 100 above.
105. See Liability Convention cited in note 100 above.
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property on board such a space object by a space object of another
launching State, the latter shall be liable only if the damage is due to
the fault of persons for whom it is responsible.l06
Article IV provides for joint and several liabilities of the first two
States for damage caused to a third State or to its natural or juridical
persons, absolute liability for damage on the surface of the Earth or
to aircraft in flight and liability based on fault for damage to a space
object elsewhere than on Earth.l07

V. A CLOSING NoTE
The preceding survey of the comparative study of the practice of
States on the Liability and Responsibility of the State of Registration
or Flag State in cases respectively of vessels, aircraft and spacecraft
I
does not appear to be final and conclusive. Each regime seems to be
in a state of flux or more exactly in a state of evolutionary transfor1
mation in search for a more comprehensive set of rules regarding liability of the State of registry for various purposes, absolute liability
1
as well as fault-based liability for sea-going vessels, for airlines and
for space objects. Flagged States or States of registration are willing 1
to accept the responsibility not so much for the loss or injury caused
by their ships, airplanes or spacecraft under national flag or registra- 1
tion but more so for the obligation to protect the flag and registry of
the fleet, especially the enhancement of freedom from terrorist attack 1
and the new-found shared or collective responsibility of users of international highways to preserve and defend the security interest of in- I
ternational waterways, international air routes and space odysseys
in geostationary or rotational orbits.
I
The concept of collective or shared responsibility has grown out
of the duty of cooperation among States and has its counterpart in
the notion of shared resources and the common responsibility for the
preservation of the integrity and conservation of inter-generational I
equity of all items forming part of the common heritage of mankind. I
Thus this study ends with one closing note. Collective responsibility is an effective method to ensure universal respect for the Rulel
of Law for the benefit of mankind as a whole anywhere, on the high
seas, in the oceans or in the skies or way up in the outer space with
the moon and other celestial bodies, yet within the reach of the law a~
conceived, interpreted and applied by man.

106. Id., Article III.
107. Id., Article IV (1) (a) and (b) and (2).
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